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ABSTRACT Human societies maintain between-group variation despite mixing of people and ideas. In order for variation to remain, 
migrants or their children must preferentially adopt local norms, customs, and beliefs. Yet the details of how cultural variation is 
maintained, despite mixing, remain unknown. This article addresses this problem by using a simple model of the evolution of cultural 
learning to interpret the results of a study of cultural variation in a small region of East Africa. I argue that the manner in which migrants 
of two diverse regions adapt to local beliefs and behavior depends on the costs and accuracy of learning in each domain. Observational 
studies are never definitive tests of any hypothesis, but these results suggest that conclusions about the significance of cultural learning 
for understanding individual attitudes and behavior depend strongly upon the domain of investigation. [Keywords: cultural evolution, 
social learning, East Africa, cultural variation]
TUDY OF THE DIVERSITY of human adaptation, social 
organization, and belief has occupied more than a cen­
tury of anthropological description and explanation. Most 
social scientists are convinced that this diversity arises from 
a number of learning strategies, both simple and complex, 
and that sophisticated social learning in particular plays a 
key role in transmitting variation in behavior between gen­
erations. Many social scientists refer to behavior that is at 
least partly acquired via social learning as culture (Kroeber 
and Kluckhohn 1952). Under this definition, few deny the 
existence of important cultural differences among individ­
uals and societies.
How particular differences form and persist, however, 
is a matter of more debate. As individuals migrate between 
cultural regions or interact with their culturally different 
neighbors, unbiased imitation and socialization will lead 
to the blending and the eventual disappearance of cultural 
variation (McElreath et al. 2003). In order for variation to 
be maintained, migrant individuals or their children must 
either (1) learn local behaviors and beliefs on their own 
or (2 ) be more likely to adopt the behaviors and beliefs of 
nonmigrants.
First, some social scientists ask us to consider that large 
portions of "culture" are actually not culture at all but, in­
stead, variation in behavior evoked by individual circum­
stances (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Under this view, many 
apparent cultural differences form and persist because of
differences in the physical and social environments indi­
viduals experience. Migrants (or their children) experience 
a new economy, ecology and social world, and figure out 
how to behave. Social learning may still play a role in trans­
mitting solutions to successive generations, but forms of in­
dividual learning “evoke" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992) new 
behavior when circumstances change, because of individu­
als migrating or to changes in the local context itself. When 
such mechanisms are important, traditions and behavioral 
differences in general persist only because differences in rel­
evant features of the environment persist. Much of the clas­
sic work in cultural ecology adopts this perspective for some 
proportion of cultural variation, either implicitly or explic­
itly (Goldschmidt 1976). Economists, the most influential 
social scientists by far, also generally rely on environmental 
and external market explanations of behavioral differences 
(Becker 1976).
A second possibility is that the acquisition of behavior 
via social learning itself leads to the formation and persis­
tence of variation among groups—from small entities like 
families to very large ones like multilingual states—perhaps 
largely independent of underlying ecological and economic 
differences. For example, if migrants and their children pref­
erentially imitate the most common beliefs and behaviors, 
then cultural variation can be stable despite substantial mix­
ing of people and ideas (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Theo­
ries of this general kind are very common and often poorly
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specified. Anthropology as a field has done a poor job con­
structing explicit models of cultural evolution, despite the 
fact that culture and human variation are among its cen­
tral concepts. A small group of anthropologists, however, 
have taken on the task of constructing explicit models of 
cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman 1981; Durham 1991; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath (2003) provide a re­
cent review. These models tackle how social learning can 
both build complex behavioral and technological adapta­
tions and produce cultural inertia, variation in beliefs, and 
maladaptive behaviors. Under these theories, differences 
may form and persist (or not) for a variety of reasons, but 
in each case appreciation of how, and from whom, people 
acquire their culture is key. Evolved psychology and indi­
vidual rationality is important here in understanding how 
individuals strategically acquire their culture, but less so in 
preparing individuals to learn any specific behavior.
Most would agree that both of the perspectives above 
are sometimes correct (Laland and Brown 2002): Some ob­
served cultural variation is the result of individuals discov­
ering what works in local circumstances, while some is the 
product of patterns of imitation and other forms of cultural 
learning. The questions are: How often and when? In this 
article, I approach the problem of how cultural differences 
persist by first outlining a general theory of the relative ben­
efits of individual and social learning. Then I present rele­
vant results from an ethnographic study of the maintenance 
of behavioral variation, patterned after the classic studies 
of R. B. Edgerton (1971) and W. R. Goldschmidt (1976) on 
how ecology relates to cultural variation. Although their 
work demonstrated general correlations between ecological 
and cultural differences, it failed to exploit the variation 
within communities to help understand how variation is 
maintained, despite the mixing of peoples from different 
regions. Using this natural variation in my own field site, I 
argue that the general models of learning make useful pre­
dictions that are consistent with the observations from the 
field. These results are important for understanding how 
differences in human behavior form and persist, because 
they help us understand how individuals strategically ac­
quire their behavior and beliefs, which in turn allows pre­
diction of the more long-term patterns of cultural diversity, 
including which changes in the physical and social envi­
ronments are likely to enhance or erode variation.
THE DESIGN OF LEARNING STRATEGIES
In this section, I outline a quantitative model of the evo­
lution of individual and cultural learning. An evolutionary 
model is necessary, because the sophisticated learning abil­
ities which make cultural variation possible are the results 
of a long history of selection acting on genes. This does not 
mean that cultural variation itself is a product of genetic 
variation, nor does it suggest that culture must ultimately 
serve genetic interests—as even the simplest models of the 
evolution of cultural learning show (see Boyd and Richerson
1985; Rogers 1988). This model is instead an exercise in de­
ducing the consequences of assuming that individuals can 
acquire their behavior in different ways and asking how 
people might employ these different learning strategies un­
der different circumstances. The goal is to derive qualitative 
predictions that we can apply to our observations. Setting 
out the theory in this way also allows us to see exactly what 
is being assumed, something that is usually not easy with 
purely verbal models. I use the model to generate predic­
tions about the conditions under which different learning 
mechanisms are likely to influence how individuals acquire 
behavior. These predictions in turn suggest what variables 
will influence patterns of behavioral variation and how cul­
tural variation might be maintained in any given setting.
Psychologists and anthropologists interested in the 
evolution of learning distinguish between individual and 
social learning (see chapters in Heyes and Galef 1996). In­
dividual learning occurs when people (or other animals) 
interact with their environment and adjust their behavior 
in light of new information. Social learning occurs when 
people are more likely to learn a behavior because of the 
behavior of other individuals. This includes both complex 
forms of social learning, like imitation, and simple forms 
in which other individuals alter the environment such that 
individuals practicing forms of individual learning are more 
likely to figure something out. In what follows, I use "so­
cial learning" to refer to forms that require psychological 
mechanisms distinct from individual learning.
A Sim ple M odel o f Ind iv idual and  Social Learning
Here I develop a simple model of the evolution of social 
learning that explicitly allows for mixed learning strategies 
as well as the costs of and errors in learning. My purpose 
is to see how variation in the costs and accuracy of learn­
ing affects which learning strategies will arise. Henrich and 
Boyd (1998) simulate a quite general model that includes ac­
curacy and produces the same qualitative conclusions. The 
model here should be thought of as a simplified argument 
designed to include the bare minimum necessary to under­
stand how this family of models generates the intuitions I 
will draw from them. I outline the assumptions and con­
clusions here, and I relegate the mathematical details to the 
appendix.
Imagine a large number of individuals who all face the 
same decision, for which there is a very large number of 
different possible behaviors. This may represent a decision 
such as what mix of crops to plant, how to rotate them, 
and how to divide labor between crops and livestock. The 
optimal behavior is determined by many exogenous vari­
ables and, therefore, may be difficult to determine. Let b be 
the average value of behaving optimally under current en­
vironmental conditions. Behaving nonoptimally entails a 
payoff of zero. Thus b actually measures the extent to which 
behaving optimally is better than behaving otherwise. As­
sume that individuals can, through interacting with the 
environment, sometimes individually acquire the optimal
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FIGURE 1. Evolutionary stable proportion of individual learning, for two probabilities of emigration (///), as functions of the rate of learning 
error (tj) and the ratio of the benefits of behaving optimally to the costs of learning (hk). At the top of each plot, individual learning is very 
error-prone, because information is unreliable or the problem is too difficult for individuals to solve. At the left side of each plot, individual 
learning is expensive in terms of effort or mistakes. Black indicates strong reliance on individual learning. White indicates strong reliance on 
social learning. Each contour is a ten percent change in the proportion of social learning at equilibrium. (A) m = 0.1. A substantial reliance 
on social learning is favored over most of the parameter space, even when costs of learning (db) are low and accuracy (1 - e) is high. (B) 
m = 0.3, very high rate of migration. Individual learning excludes pure social learning for a good range of values, when either costs are low 
or accuracy is high. When costs are high (b/c low) or accuracy is low (e high), however, social learning may still dominate.
behavior, but e of the time they cannot and are stuck with 
what people have done before—whether it is optimal or not. 
Individual learning is costly, however, because of opportu­
nity costs and potentially dangerous events while exploring 
the environment, resulting in an average cost c.
Assume now there are a number of environments, and 
the population is split among them. Individuals emigrate 
each generation with probability m. This captures the nearly 
universal phenomenon of mixing of peoples due to inter­
marriage, capture, and exchange of ideas. Individuals, both 
natives and those new to an environment, must decide each 
generation how to acquire their behavior. In the appendix, 
I show how the above assumptions lead to an expression 
for the mix of individual and social learning that will result 
from natural selection on genes influencing this mix. This 
expression allows us to vary the costs and accuracy of learn­
ing and generate qualitative predictions about how much 
individuals might rely upon individual or social learning 
under different circumstances. Over much of the parameter 
space, a stable mix of individual and social learning exists 
(Figure 1). Social learning is profitable only if there is not 
too much migration (in is not too large). Provided this is 
true, social learning does better as the costs of individual 
learning (c) and the rate of learning errors (e) increase. If 
individual learning is sufficiently cheap and accurate, there 
is no problem for social learning to solve, and individual 
learning will either be very common or exclusively present. 
Some pure social learning can evolve under a wide range 
of conditions because pure social learning exploits already
paid costs of individual learning needed to generate novel 
adaptations.
Model Summary and Predictions
The model above suggests that the amount of pure social 
learning, as a proportion of total learning, will increase as 
the costs of individual learning increase and the accuracy of 
individual learning decreases. This qualitative result is un­
likely to depend on the precise assumptions of the model, 
because the tradeoff at work is a very basic one, common to 
a wide range of models (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Rogers
1988). One key advantage of social learning lies in avoiding 
the costs of individual trial and error. The price is that pure 
social learners need to be at least partly credulous, and so 
risk adopting outdated or inaccurate behavior. These bene­
fits and costs balance at a proportion of pure social learn­
ing, which is often rather high. However, when learning 
on one's own is very inexpensive and highly accurate, so­
cial learning may be quite rare. When learning is costly and 
error prone, social learning should be much more frequent.
It is easy to interpret the costs and accuracy as taking 
different values, or ranges of values, for different tasks and 
problems. Instead of being prepared to employ individual 
learning with the same likelihood in all instances, people 
are probably sensitive to the costs and accuracies in differ­
ent contexts. For example, tasting mushrooms has poten­
tially very high costs, because of poisoning, but the accuracy 
might be quite high, as a nonpoisonous mushroom is easily 
identified once sampled. In this case, the costs are high, as
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TABLE 1. Example domains and qualitative differences in costs o f individual learning (time spent, price o f experimentation) and accuracy 
o f learning (chance o f process leading to  better/best solution). The models in the main text suggest social learning w ill be more im portant 
(adaptive and frequent) when costs are high (cells 2 and 4) or accuracy is low (cells 3 and 4). Only in cell 1 is individual learning expected 
to  be dominant. Social learning is expected to  especially im portant in cell 4, in which both accuracy is low and costs are high.
Costs of individual learning 
Accuracy Low High
High 1. Choosing tool raw materials: Materials often easily
acquired, abundant, so experiments cheap; effectiveness 
easy to evaluate outside critical tasks.
Low 3. Predicting the weather: Relevant information largely
free, but mostly uncorrelated with outcomes or 
insufficient to make an accurate judgment.
2. Identifying dangerous plants/animals: Experiments 
potentially deadly; experiments very diagnostic, 
however.
4. Choosing a crop/mate/place to live: Experiments 
time-consuming and expensive; many variables 
important, so outcomes highly variable.
well as the accuracy, and we would expect a good amount of 
pure social learning. Deciding whether to use steel or stone 
to make an axe, however, is likely to be cheap and rather ac­
curate. In this case, we would expect more individual learn­
ing. Table 1 gives examples of different real-world problems 
which vary qualitatively in costs of learning and degree of 
accuracy. Of course, what individuals may be learning, ei­
ther individually or socially, is how to make decisions in 
these domains, and not specific choices. For example, one 
might be taught what cues to attend to in predicting the 
weather and even how to integrate multiple cues.
But how do individuals estimate the costs or accuracy of 
learning? This is another important problem to be solved. 
One way in which individuals might experience accuracy 
is when there is a strong correlation between behavior and 
outcome. If only some mushrooms of a deadly variety are 
poisonous, then experiments are less diagnostic and the ac­
curacy of individual learning is reduced. In general, vari­
ation in outcomes might serve as a cue to the low qual­
ity of information available via interacting with the envi­
ronment. Every farmer knows that many factors influence 
yield, leading to high variance in yields for apparently sim­
ilar crops and methods, and so distilling the signal from the 
noise in such information is difficult. The costs of learning 
might be assessed by estimating the time and energy put 
into experiments and judging the risks involved in explo­
ration. For example, it is obvious to most of us that trying 
out a career for a few years is a very costly form of individ­
ual learning. A series of anthropologically informed exper­
iments addressing these hypotheses would go a long way 
towards linking individual experience to the theory.
It goes without saying that the arguments above only 
hold when all other things are equal. That is, any num­
ber of factors such as ritual or symbolic importance of a 
behavior or technology could alter the predictions. Yet gen­
eral theories are just as necessary for understanding cultural 
variation as is appreciating the details of each case. The con­
sequences of the model for understanding the maintenance 
of cultural variation in human societies lie in recognizing 
that the differential use of individual and social learning 
will lead to different predictions about the processes that 
lead migrant individuals or their children to become be­
haviorally like locals. When individual learning is impor­
tant, variables related to the payoffs and nature of the spe­
cific problem will best predict individual adaptation to local 
norms of behavior. As individuals interact with their new 
physical and social environments, they learn about behav­
ior and may come to resemble neighbors not because of 
imitation but, rather, because they now experience similar 
reinforcements. But when social learning is important, in­
dividual payoffs and other aspects of the problem may only 
weakly determine behavior. Migrants may realize that their 
previous behaviors are poorly suited to their new environ­
ment, but since individual learning is ineffective or costly, 
they will learn socially from neighbors and bypass individ­
ual reinforcements, as a best strategy. If individual learning 
is weak enough, then traditions can persist in such domains 
despite important changes in the environment.
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE MAINTENANCE 
OF CULTURAL VARIATION
In order to investigate how cultural variation is maintained, 
I selected a natural experiment that allowed me to address 
the maintenance of intraethnic cultural variation predi­
cated on ecological differences. Not all or even most cultural 
variation is necessarily patterned after the physical environ­
ment, but since at least some cultural variation promotes 
individual survival and reproduction in terms of the local 
environment, it makes sense to formulate and test hypothe­
ses about how different cultural variants maybe adaptations 
to different ecologies and economies. It also makes sense to 
use regional comparisons within closely related groups to 
increase the chance that observed differences are derived 
in each case and to ease interpretation of the causes of 
variation (Johnson 1991). Differences measured against a 
vast background of similarity admit fewer possible expla­
nations than differences measured against a background of 
immense difference.
Walter Goldschmidt (1976) and Robert Edgerton's 
(1971) study of four East African tribes, each varied inter­
nally by ecology and economy, is the best ethnographic 
research to date addressing the correlations between eco­
logical and cultural variables. Edgerton used a standard 
questionnaire in eight communities: four predominantly 
pastoralist and four predominantly farming, among four
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tribes—the Kamba, Pokot, Hehe, and Sebei. While ethnic 
group and language group predicted most of the cultural 
variation in the whole data set, several important aspects 
of personality and culture correlated strongly with ecology 
and economy irrespective of ethnic and language group.
Unfortunately, their study did not record much 
individual-level data, and so it could not address how over­
all community-level differences, correlated with ecology, 
were generated or maintained. Edgerton could not answer, 
for example, if farmers living in pastoralist communities 
were more like farmers or pastoralists of their ethnic group, 
because he did not know who in the sample owned livestock 
and who did not, but only where each informant lived at 
the time of the interview. Answering questions of this kind 
is important, because there are many ways that variation 
between farmers and pastoralists could be maintained, and 
sorting among them focuses us on more specific hypotheses 
to test and effects to measure. There might be a developmen­
tal period during which some aspects of belief and behavior 
are fixed, meaning that variation is maintained partly be­
cause of early socialization. It may also be true that parents 
are important in early cultural transmission, such that the 
children of migrants are different from the children of na­
tives, but that peer influence increases with age, such that 
adult patterns of variation are maintained despite the flow 
of persons between regions. Another important factor to 
consider is the kind of household (farming or herding) in 
which an individual lives or, rather, the kind of household 
in which most individuals in the local community live.
To begin to address these questions, I selected a field 
site in Tanzania patterned after the Edgerton (1971) study, 
with a strong ecological gradient, along which a single eth­
nic group is economically differentiated into two groups: 
(1) predominantly farmers and (2) predominantly pastoral­
ists. Using a subset of Edgerton's instrument, I replicated 
some overall differences between farmers and pastoralists 
and then used individual-level data to shed light on the pro­
cesses that have allowed these differences to persist, despite 
substantial contact and flow of individuals between the re­
gions. Migrants between farming and pastoralist economies 
provide the crucial data to evaluate the predictions derived 
above. If individual learning is important in a given do­
main, individual reinforcements arising from the nature of 
the problem should predict changes in individual behavior. 
If social learning is dominant, then individual reinforce­
ments will be less relevant than features of the community 
in predicting the behavior of migrants.
Ethnographic Setting
The Usangu Plains is a 15,000 square kilometer region of 
Southwest Tanzania that is home to a number of ethnic 
groups living throughout a gradient between wet and dry 
environmental zones (Hazlewood and Livingstone 1978; 
Pipping 1976). In the wetter regions of the south, annual 
rainfall ranges from 600-1000 millimeters. The dry, season­
ally flooded range lands to the north vary widely in rainfall,
from 200-600 millimeters annually, with much more inter­
annual variation at specific locales.
Individuals who identify themselves as Sangu vary 
tremendously in economic organization, as a consequence 
of the ecological variation in the plains. To this day the 
single largest ethnic group in the Usangu Plains, the Sangu 
originated from a mixture of Bantu peoples present in the 
region in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when they united 
under a hereditary chief and began raiding their neighbors 
for livestock and taking slaves (Shorter 1972; Wright 1971). 
At the peak of their power, the Sangu were wealthy cat­
tle pastoralists who wielded considerable military might. 
Presently, most Sangu are farmers, although probably a hun­
dred households still keep herds in the plains.
Since 1997,1 have been doing research in both the agri­
cultural and pastoralist zones of Usangu. In the areas sur­
rounding and including the village of Utengule, the vast 
majority of households exclusively farm, although some 
households keep moderate-sized herds. Residents live in 
very closely spaced settlements, where often there is less 
than ten meters between homes. Most farm on small plots 
of land, between one-half and two acres in size, outside 
the village. The major pastoralist regions begin about thirty 
kilometers north and east of Utengule. The areas surround­
ing and including the villages of Ukwaheri, Uyaule, Mjenje, 
and Upagama are less villages than collections of small pa­
trilineal clan-based communities. Household compounds 
are very scattered. Distances of one to two kilometers are 
common, although households within a clan tend to reside 
closer. Some residents of the drier regions do not own cat­
tle. Many, however, own at least some livestock, and those 
with larger herds (typically more than 20 cattle) practice 
transhumance. Every household farms at least an acre of 
corn, although the land in this region is much less produc­
tive than in the farming region.
M ethods
Diversity of household economies within each region al­
lows me to estimate separate influences of economy and 
community. Changes in household economy, as the result 
of intrahousehold changes and migrations, allow me also 
to estimate the effects of the economy individuals grew up 
in. I interviewed 169 Sangu individuals, 83 in the farm­
ing region and 86 in the pastoralist region, over a nine- 
month period, sampling across age classes, with approxi­
mately equal numbers of men and women, to capture both 
average regional differences and the dispositions of individ­
uals who have changed household economies during their 
lives. I conducted interviews in Swahili. Aside from a local 
assistant and the informant, only nursing infants were al­
lowed to be present during interviews. During interviews, I 
recorded demographic and economic data on each individ­
ual, as well as personal histories of residence, and economic 
information for father's household. For a subsample, I vali­
dated herd sizes and acres under cultivation by observation 
and found informant reports to be very accurate. For all
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TABLE 2. Interview questions discussed in the article, as well as the ir coded responses.
Domain Question Response Codes
Preference for friends 
Respect for elders 
Witchcraft
Think of a person who has many friends [mamfiki], but very few kin \ndugu], for 
example brothers or cousins. Now think of a person who has very few friends, 
but many kin. Which kind person would you rather be?
Think of a household consisting of a father {tnzee] and his sons [vijana wake\. 
Now, imagine that father has committed an error of judgment. When can one 
of the sons tell the father he is wrong?
Imagine someone owns a number of cattle. One day, 10 of those cattle suddenly 




herd sizes, I also checked reports with estimates from two 
other unrelated individuals.
From Edgerton's (1971) results, I selected to investi­
gate those domains that showed the greatest variation in 
response between farmers and pastoralists in order to maxi­
mize statistical power. I report the results from the three do­
mains that replicated Edgerton's findings, showing strong 
differences between Sangu farmers and pastoralists. There­
fore, my results shed light on the maintenance of behavioral 
variation. Table 2 summarizes the interview questions.
Dom ain f: Preference fo r Friends or Kin
In four different ethnic groups in East Africa, Edgerton 
(1971) previously found that farmers, more often than 
pastoralists, valued friends over kin. One potential expla­
nation for this finding is that kin are much more reli­
able cooperating partners when community membership 
is shifting, as in partly nomadic pastoralist communi­
ties. Models of the evolution of reciprocity (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971) and large-scale cooperation 
(Boyd and Richerson 1992) suggest that cooperation among 
unrelated individuals, such as friends, is stable only when 
pairings are sufficiently likely to interact again. The shorter 
shadow of the future in seminomadic communities may 
diminish the domains of attraction for stable reciprocity 
among nonkin (McElreath in press).
I used a narrative question (Table 2) with open discus­
sion afterward to estimate Sangu attitudes in this domain, as 
well as participant observations in each community to val­
idate the interview results. I recorded informant responses 
and later coded them into the categories "friend," indicat­
ing a preference for friends, and "kin," indicating a prefer­
ence for kin.
The costs and accuracy of learning are likely low and 
high, respectively, in this domain. In the daily lives of indi­
viduals, there are many opportunities for interactions with 
friends and kin, and the consequences of relying on friends 
or kin are often easy to appreciate. Indeed, some (Cosmides
1989) argue that people are prepared by natural selection to 
learn when reciprocity pays and when it does not. Prepared 
learning of this kind would direct an individual's attention 
to relevant cues and reduce the search costs and increase the 
accuracy of individual learning. For these reasons, I code 
this domain into cell 1 of Table 1 (low costs, high accu­
racy). In some cases, costs of mistakes in this domain may be
substantial. For example, relying on fair-weather friends for 
mutual defense could prove deadly. In terms of the model, 
this means b is large relative to behaving nonoptimally. As 
c is scaled relative to b, this increases the range of condi­
tions that favor individual learning. The predictions derived 
before thus suggest that migrants between regions should 
change their attitudes when they change their household 
economies, since the reinforcements and cues relevant in 
this domain are tied to different modes of subsistence.
Dom ain 2: Respect for Elders
Pastoralist societies were found to emphasize more com­
mand and control by elders, as well as respect for them, 
than farmer societies (Edgerton 1971). One hypothesis that 
might explain this observation is that wealth is inherited 
more in traditional East African pastoralist settings than 
among farmers. In most ethnographically known pastoral­
ist societies, sons inherit part of their father's herds, ei­
ther directly or through their mother's portion. Sons also 
rely on parents' herds as sources of substantial bridewealth, 
which is paid to a potential bride's father in nearly all East 
African pastoralist groups in exchange for the right to marry 
her. Under this somewhat cynical hypothesis, individuals in 
pastoralists groups simply cannot afford to offend, alienate, 
or fall into the disfavor of elders, who control their future 
livelihoods (Edgerton 1971; Goldschmidt 1976).
In contrast, many agricultural economies in East Africa 
have only recently experienced the crowding necessary to 
drive land inheritance. For example, among the Nyakyusa 
of Southwest Tanzania (Wilson 1979), young men actually 
founded their own villages, inheriting little if any land and 
livelihood from their parents. And while bridewealth ex­
isted and exists in agricultural communities as well, it is 
usually much lower and frequently subject to institutions 
like credit. For these reasons, there is less reason in farming 
communities to obey, please, or fear elders, for they control 
less of one's future livelihood. The Nyakyusa are an usu­
ally extreme case, but the fact that especially valuable land, 
like that which existed in old craters, was the only land 
passed down to children (Wilson 1979) suggests a general 
importance of land scarcity and value in determining inher­
itance practices—especially since the Nyakyusa themselves 
emphasized eminently moral reasons for the lack of it.
I used a narrative (Table 2) with following discussion to 
estimate attitudes in this domain, as well as observation of
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interactions in each community. I coded responses into the 
categories "whenever," indicating that elders should not be 
feared or especially respected, and “never," indicating that 
elders should often or always be especially respected.
Like the previous domain, daily life provides opportu­
nities for individuals to experience the consequences of be­
having in different ways towards elders, and so individual 
learning can effectively adjust attitudes. There are two ways 
to regard costs and accuracy in this domain. First, since in­
heritance of wealth is a much rarer life-history event than 
reciprocity with friends or kin, even if individuals attend to 
events in the lives of their friends and family, they will have 
much less information in this domain than in the previous. 
Thus while the costs of collecting relevant information and 
evaluating it are likely rather low, the relative lack of infor­
mation implies that learning in this domain may be much 
less accurate than in the previous. Second, it is probable 
that individuals can quickly and intuitively appreciate the 
power elders hold over them without much experience. If 
few factors other than an individual's behavior determine 
elders' treatment of them, then this maybe the case. It is dif­
ficult to decide based on first principles which argument is 
more important. In the first case, I place this domain in cell 
3 (low costs, low accuracy). Somehow, predicting how elders 
will behave seems to remind one of predicting the weather. 
Individual learning may be influential here but less so than 
in cell 1. In the second case, however, I place this domain in 
cell 1 (low cost, high accuracy) with the previous domain, 
where individual learning will strongly influence variation, 
and so individual economy, rather than community, will be 
most influential.
Dom ain 3: Prevalence o f W itchcraft
A number of ethnographers have commented on the high 
prevalence of witchcraft beliefs in farmer communities, 
relative to pastoralist communities (see Baxter 1972). The 
source of this difference is unclear and there is certainly no 
favored theory. However, a classic and influential theory of 
magic (Gmelch and Felson 1980; Gmlech 1999; Malinowski 
1922) suggests that people resort to magical beliefs in cases 
in which they have less control over outcomes. Because it 
is plausible that farmers experience or perceive less control 
over their crops than pastoralists do over their herds, Mali­
nowski's conjecture may apply in this case as well.
Another idea, suggested by Edgerton (1971), is that 
witchcraft is more common among farmers as a result of re­
pressed conflict, because it is easy for a farmer to recognize 
the importance of not fighting with a permanent neigh­
bor. This repressed conflict, often aired openly among mo­
bile pastoralists, then leads to lingering suspicion, because 
disagreements are rarely fully resolved. When something 
unfortunate happens, the still-angry neighbor becomes the 
prime suspect. This hypothesis is not mutually exclusive 
with Malinowski's, of course, and both may explain some 
fraction of the observed difference between farmers and 
pastoralists.
I used two narratives, in a between-subjects design, to 
get at both the overall belief in witchcraft and the tendency 
to nominate witchcraft as a cause of misfortune. I coded 
responses into two categories: (1) “other misfortune," indi­
cating that the informant offered an explanation other than 
witchcraft, and (2) “witchcraft," indicating that the infor­
mant nominated magical foul play or the use of traditional 
medicines as the cause of the misfortune. Here I report only 
the first narrative (as it appears in Table 2), as the second 
addressed more the precise nature witchcraft beliefs than 
how differences are maintained.
This domain is quite different from the previous two 
in that costs of learning are possibly prohibitively high and 
accuracy is certainly low. Suppose, for example, trying to 
discover why a particular herd animal died. One could nom­
inate many hypotheses: disease, angry spirits, poisonous 
snake bite, poisoned feed, will of God, or many others. De­
ciding among them may be very difficult, even for a team 
of veterinarians, partly because many variables pertain in 
such cases and simply controlling for noise in measurement 
is a giant epidemiological challenge. Consider how difficult 
it has proven to be to verify that many commonly used 
medicines like Vitamin C and Zinc actually do anything to 
prevent or treat colds. And as E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1937) 
noted, the existence of a nonmagical cause is not a complete 
explanation. If it is snakebite, why was the snake there this 
time? The cow had been at the water hole many times be­
fore but was never bitten. Answers to successive questions 
like these are much harder to come by in this domain than 
in either the valuation of friends or respect for elders.
This is perhaps the principle behind the cross-cultural 
regularity that spirits can become invisible at will; stories 
about visible magical beings are quickly disproved by in­
dividual experience. Because individual learning is highly 
ineffective for evaluating claims about supernatural phe­
nomena, social learning can be a very powerful force in 
such domains. This is particularly true because humans may 
be designed to respond to difficult empirical circumstances 
with imitation, as I argued in presenting the model. For 
these reasons, I place this third domain in cell 4 (Table 1: 
high cost, low accuracy). Collecting the information nec­
essary to evaluate competing hypotheses is expensive and 
time consuming and usually beyond the capabilities of an 
individual. Likewise, even with lots of information, some 
decisions are simply very difficult to make on the basis of 
empirical information, because so many factors influence 
the outcome. In this domain, we should expect that indi­
vidual reinforcements, arising from personal economic ar­
rangements, will be less influential than communities, as 
social learning might lead migrants to adopt the beliefs and 
behaviors of a majority of pastoralists, even if they are not 
themselves pastoralists, and vice versa.
Results
I analyzed the coded responses against individual economic 
variables and residence in two ways. First, I present overall
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differences in the frequency of responses, in order to char­
acterize the variation between the farming and pastoralist 
regions. Together with these overall interview differences, 
I summarize informal observations gathered while living 
in the communities, in order to provide an understanding 
of how the interview responses may be reflected in other 
behavior. Then I present parameter estimates for logistic 
models predicting individual responses. These estimates in­
dicate the influences of community residence, household 
economy, and previous household economy on individual 
attitudes, controlling for individual characteristics like gen­
der and age.
Overall Regional D ifferences
General trends agree with previous findings, once house­
hold production is taken into account: 50 percent (22/44) 
of individuals living in the farming region said they val­
ued friends more than kin. However, 56 percent (28/50) of 
individuals living in the pastoralist region said the same. 
This seems, if anything, the opposite of previous findings. 
However, classifying individuals by presence or absence of 
more than five cattle shows a clear difference. Sixty-four 
percent (35/55) of individuals in households without more 
than five cattle responded "friends" (see Table 2), while 38 
percent (15/39) of individuals in pastoralist households re­
sponded the same (Fisher's exact one-tailed, p =  0.0137).
The differences in the remaining two domains are 
much clearer. Thirty-one percent (15/48) of farming region 
residents claimed that a man should never tell his father 
he (the father) is wrong, while 50 percent (25/50) of pas­
toralists said the same (Fisher's exact one-tailed, p =  0.046). 
Seventy-five percent (15/20) of individuals in the farming 
region responded "witchcraft" (see Table 2) when asked 
about ambiguous misfortune, while only 27 percent (8/30) 
of pastoralist region individuals mentioned witchcraft at all 
(Fisher's exact one-tailed, p =  0.0009).
Observational Evidence
Pastoralist individuals with whom I spent significant 
amounts of time had few friends who were not close kin. 
One went as far as to tell me that he would rather have "one 
brother than ten friends" (conversation with author, July
1997). Social life in the pastoralist regions revolved around 
kinship in a way it did not in the farming areas. This was 
not a result of the absence of non-kin to befriend: While kin 
tend to live close to one another, individuals also meet non­
kin on most days. Also, the fact that kin live nearby one an­
other is probably an endogenous outcome of preferences, 
not a cause. If pastoralists preferred friends to kin, they 
would presumably move households nearer to their friends. 
Informants in the farming region instead spent most of their 
social time with unrelated individuals. Several individuals, 
when asked about the roles of friends and kin in their lives, 
complained immediately about the costs of having a large 
family, most notably that one is obligated to share with all 
of them, which makes one perpetually poor.
No difference was more obvious, both to the Sangu 
and myself, than how young people acted towards elders in 
the two regions. Young adults in the farming villages gave 
the common respectful greetings to elders, but these greet­
ings were often abbreviated ("shoo" or “shmoo" instead of 
“shikamoo"), which was representative of a general lack of 
formality in their interactions. In the interviews and later 
conversations, some indicated that elders in fact had no 
power over their lives. Several suggested that a young man 
should notify his father of a mistake because of an egalitar­
ian ethic: "The father would do the same to his son" (con­
versation with author, July 1997). Elders themselves in the 
farming areas held the same opinions. Young people in the 
pastoralist region, however, treated elders with much more 
respect and ritualized interaction. A young person in the 
herding region seemed incapable of passing an elder mem­
ber of the community without stopping, bowing slightly, 
casting one's eyes downward in the universal human dis­
play of subordination (Henrich and Gil-White 2001), and 
greeting him. If several elders were present, the young per­
son would perform this greeting for each of them individ­
ually before continuing onward.
Finally, it is much more difficult to practice participant 
observation of witchcraft. Secret and locally abhorred ac­
tivities are naturally the last frontier of ethnographic re­
search. Even court records, which might provide estimates 
of relative prevalence of witchcraft cases, were difficult to 
come by, as court clerks told me that they were asked not 
to record such cases. One way of corroborating the inter­
view responses, however, is by asking traditional healers 
(waganga) to list the principle reasons clients approached 
them. While the frequency of healers is difficult to interpret 
because of the substantial differences in population den­
sity between the two regions, the ranking of problems that 
drove the business of traditional healers should not be bi­
ased in any similar way. I interviewed two healers in the pas­
toralist region and three in the farmer region, asking them 
to list freely the most common medicines they prepared 
and their purposes. In the top five for both pastoralists, 
there were two medicines that were used only to cure curses 
placed by witches (wachawi). The others included love po­
tions, good-luck charms, and beauty elixirs. In contrast, for 
the farmers, nearly all of the medicines commonly named 
were used to cure curses and poisons; though one farming- 
region healer also listed love potions.
Logistic M odel Estimates
I analyzed the results further by fitting the coded responses 
in each domain to a logistic model with six predictors: (1) 
greater than five cattle in household (binary); (2) greater 
than five cattle in father's household (binary); (3) commu­
nity (binary); (4) age (years); (5) education (years); and (6) 
gender (binary). Cattle holdings were made into discrete 
categories because the distribution is very nonnormal, hav­
ing a mode at zero. I split the sample at five cattle because 
this is about the number after which grazing, rather than
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TABLE 3. Logistic model estimates fo r fu ll models o f six predictors against each domain. The estimate is fo llowed by the odds-ratio, in 
parentheses, in each case. The odds-ratio here is the increased odds o f observing the dependent variable when the predictor goes from  its 
minimum to  its maximum value. The standard error o f each estimate appears below the significance level.
Predictor
Dependent variable (See Table 2 for meanings of codes)
Friends/kin 
"friends" N = 89
Respect 
for elders "never" N = 93
Witchcraft 
"other misfortune" N = 49
Estimate (Odds) Sig (SE) Estimate (Odds) Sig (SE) Estimate (Odds) Sig (SE)
>5 cattle in -1.2455 0.0176 1.3249 0.0101 -0.5549 0.5699
household (0.2878) (0.5417) (3.7620) (0.5260) (0.5741) (0.9991)
> 5 cattle in father's -0.3146 0.6371 1.1629 0.0626 0.2174 0.7743
household (0.7301) (0.6691) (3.1993) (0.6362) (1.2428) (0.7572)
community 0.3178 0.3803 -0.1412 0.6818 1.6861 0.0036
(herders = 1) (1.8880) (0.3674) (0.7540) (0.3463) (29.1411) (0.6783)
age -0.0468 0.0521 -0.0079 0.7500 0.0762 0.0274
(19-76 years) (0.0455) (0.0250) (0.5918) (0.0250) (153.1885) (0.0384)
education -0.1588 0.1488 -0.0203 0.8578 0.3862 0.0345
(0-11 years) (0.1744) (0.1128) (0.7996) (0.1134) (69.9600) (0.1993)
gender -0.2086 0.4390 -0.1143 0.6679 0.4240 0.2905
(female = 1) (0.6588) (0.2702) (0.7957) (0.2665) (2.3348) (0.4164)
corralled feeding, becomes mandatory. I omit acres under 
cultivation from these analyses because they in fact do not 
differentiate farmers from pastoralists; Sangu pastoralists 
farm at least as much as pure farmers do but also practice 
transhumant grazing. Plausible interactions for these mod­
els are not significant and do not change the characteristic 
results. For these reasons, I do not report them. The model 
estimates with six predictors are presented in Table 3.
After estimating the full models described above, I 
found the subset of the six predictors that lead to the op­
timal model, from a likelihood perspective. Adding an ad­
ditional parameter to a model will almost always improve 
its fit to data. However, the improvement in fit may sim­
ply result from adding another degree of freedom, not from 
capturing a genuine causal influence. For each domain, I 
found the smallest set of parameters for which adding any 
additional parameter did not result in an increase in fit be­
yond that expected by chance, by a standard likelihood- 
ratio test (see Hilborn and Mangel 1997 for an accessible 
introduction). These reduced models provide more accu­
rate estimates of the key parameters, and so I present them 
in addition to the full models in Table 4.
The best predictors of responses in domain 1 (prefer­
ence for friends) are cattle in household and years of age. 
Living in a household with cattle, controlling for the pres­
ence or absence of cattle in natal household, led to a 71 per­
cent reduction in odds of responding "friends." The kind of 
household an individual was raised in had a much smaller 
effect. The best estimate of its influence is a 27 percent 
reduction in odds, and this average has a very high vari­
ance. The effect of age was to reduce the odds of responding 
"friends": Each year of age produced a 5 percent reduction 
on average. While this effect is weak between individuals of 
adjacent age groups, across the lifespan, its effect is tremen­
dous. It is unclear whether this estimate reflects changing 
attitudes with age or, rather, a cohort effect in which the 
value of kin has changed over time. Finally, the best esti­
mate for the effect of community residence, controlling for 
household economy, is a 190 percent (approximately dou­
ble) increase in odds of answering "friends" when switching 
between farming and pastoralist regions, on average. How­
ever, this estimate is highly variable. In the reduced model, 
only cattle in household and cattle in father's household are 
retained. The direction of the effect of father's household
TABLE 4. Logistic model estimates fo r optimal f i t  models in each domain. These models were found by likelihood-ratio criteria. Missing 
predictors did not improve the f i t  sufficiently beyond w hat is expected by chance when adding more parameters to  the model.
Predictor

















>5 cattle in household -1.2813 0.0049 1.1342 0.0137 __ __
(0.2777) (0.4692) (3.1086) (0.4641)
>5 cattle in father's 0.3822 0.4112 1.1579 0.0113 - _
household (1.4655) (0.4690) (3.1833) (0.4618)
community - - - - 1.0551 0.0006
(herders = 1) (8.2500) (0.3306)
McElreath • Social Learning and Cultural Variation 317
economy switches, and it is still highly variable, suggesting 
its overall effect is small or inconsistent, even though it is 
retained in the optimal model. No plausible interaction, for 
example (community) x (father's cattle), appears to reduce 
the variance in this estimate.
Domain 2 (respect for elders) responses are best pre­
dicted by household economy and father's household econ­
omy. All other estimates are negligible. Living in a pas- 
toralist household increases the odds of responding "never" 
(see Table 2) by 376 percent on average. Having grown 
up in a pastoralist household similar increases the odds 
of answering "never" by 320 percent, controlling for cur­
rent household type. Community residence, controlling for 
household economy itself, has little effect on responses. The 
optimal model drops all the other predictors and produces 
very similar estimates for the effects of both current and 
natal household economy, 311 percent and 318 percent in­
creases, respectively.
The third domain, witchcraft, shows strong effects of 
community residence, education and age, but smaller ef­
fects of household type. Controlling for household econ­
omy, switching to the pastoralist region resulted in a 29 
fold increase in the odds of answering "other misfortune" 
to the witchcraft narrative in Table 2. Cattle in own house­
hold and in father's household had much smaller and vari­
able effects. Education had the easily understood effect of 
decreasing likelihood of mentioning witchcraft; each year 
of education, on average, produced a 147 percent increase 
in the odds of not mentioning witchcraft. Each year of age 
reduced the odds of mentioning witchcraft by eight percent 
on average. The optimal model, however, drops the educa­
tion and age effects, retaining only community of residence. 
The loss of education and age likely results from the smaller 
sample size in this domain (the sample was split among 
the two different witchcraft narratives). The estimate of the 
community effect in the reduced model is an eightfold (800 
percent) increase in the odds of not mentioning witchcraft, 
when switching to the pastoralist community. Adding edu­
cation and age back in again increases the magnitude of this 
estimate, but education and age themselves are not retained 
in the optimal model.
DISCUSSION
The results of the model estimations suggest that individual 
economic exposure, either own household type or the type 
of household one grew up in, most strongly influence the 
dispositions of Sangu individuals in the first two domains, 
preference for friends and respect for elders. In the third 
domain, witchcraft, individual economic exposure has lit­
tle effect. Instead, community residence is the best predic­
tor of attitudes, regardless of household type or the type of 
economy an individual experienced previously.
Dom ain f: Preferences for Friends and  Kin
I argued earlier that, in the first domain (preference for 
friends, Table 2), we should expect individual learning to
have a strong influence, because costs are likely quite low 
and accuracy high (cell 1, Table 1). This leads to the predic­
tion that individual experience should be a powerful deter­
minant of attitudes in this domain.
The analyses above support this prediction by showing 
that current household economy is the only consistently 
strong predictor of the overall pattern of regional differ­
ences. Previous household economy has an effect, but it 
is inconsistent in direction in the full and optimal mod­
els. This suggests that recent and immediate circumstances 
most strongly influence attitudes, again consistent with the 
prediction that individual learning should be common and 
important in this domain.
Dom ain 2: Respect for Elders
For the second domain (respect for elders, Table 2), it is 
harder to produce a clear prediction. It is plausible that in­
dividuals can easily appreciate the negative consequences 
of disrespecting elders in pastoralist contexts, and so indi­
vidual learning might be a powerful determinant of adult 
attitudes (cell 1, Table 1), provided that not too many fac­
tors other than behavior towards elders influence their treat­
ment of younger individuals. However, the events in which 
the consequences might manifest are probably rarer than 
those in the first domain (preference for friends), and conse­
quently social learning may have a stronger influence here, 
because of the inability for individuals to acquire enough 
information to make an accurate judgment (cell 3, Table 1).
The results of the analyses above are consistent with a 
strong influence of individual learning but suggest either a 
complementary influence of social learning or a develop­
mental period during which individual experience is more 
determining of adult attitudes. The strong and consistent 
effect of current household economy is consistent with in­
dividual learning, as in the previous domain. However, the 
equally strong and consistent effect of previous household 
economy regardless of current circumstances or commu­
nity of residence, implies that recent experience is not as 
important as in domain 1.
Dom ain 3: W itchcraft
Domain 3 (witchcraft, Table 2) is likely to show the weak­
est influence of individual learning: Costs of acquiring ef­
fective information to make an accurate judgment are pro­
hibitively high, and accuracy is quite low even when consid­
erable effort is put forward to acquire relevant information 
(cell 4, Table 1). The influence of social learning should be 
very strong in this domain, reducing the influence of in­
dividual economic circumstances and increasing the influ­
ence of cultural surroundings.
The parameter estimates above are consistent with this 
view of the domain. Neither of the individual household 
economic predictors was important in either the full or re­
duced model. Instead, community residence was the best 
predictor of responses, regardless of current or previous cir­
cumstances, and has a very large effect, even in the optimal
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model, in which the plausibly real effects of education and 
age are removed and diminish the estimate greatly.
Farmers living in pastoralist communities experience 
very different reinforcements than pastoralists in these re­
gions but still regard witchcraft to be less prevalent. This 
may be because they do not trust their own judgments 
about the causes of misfortune and instead are readily in­
fluenced by the ambient judgments of the majority around 
them. An opposite argument might hold for pastoralists liv­
ing in the farming communities: While they experience 
very different incentives and reinforcements than their 
neighbors, they have good reason not to trust their own 
judgments about the causes of misfortune and so are easily 
swayed by local beliefs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Observational studies are plagued by a general lack of con­
trol. Even in natural experiments of the kind I have ex­
ploited here, in which similar individuals are divided by an 
ecological gradient, it is impossible to control for or mea­
sure even a modest proportion of the possible confounding 
factors. For definitive tests of hypotheses, highly controlled 
experiments are usually to be preferred. Nevertheless, obser­
vational studies are essential because the social sciences are 
presumably interested in explaining behavior in the "wild," 
not in the laboratory. The true test of any theory is its ability 
to make useful predictions about naturally occurring phe­
nomena. Even so, it is certainly useful to mention and at­
tempt to address a few alternative explanations and poten­
tially confounding variables in this study. In some cases, I 
do not believe the current data are adequate to address the 
alternatives, yet it is still important to spell out what form 
these alternatives might take.
Is the W itchcraft Result a Product 
o f D ifferential Expertise?
The result that witchcraft was mentioned less often among 
pastoralists could result from the fact that I asked about 
the death of cattle, and members of the pastoralist com­
munity simply know more about cattle and their possible 
causes of death. To deal with this possibility, I asked non- 
pastoralist members of the farming community to name 
potential causes of the deaths, other than witchcraft. Farm­
ers had no trouble naming several of the most commonly 
named causes among pastoralists. The farmers nevertheless 
insisted that I had asked what someone would first think 
caused the deaths, and this would be witchcraft (uchawi). 
Because farmers seem to know many of the causes nomi­
nated by pastoralists, it seems unlikely that differential ex­
perience with cattle or exposure to discussion of the causes 
of livestock mortality can explain the variation between the 
communities.
Pastoralists in the farming region certainly know addi­
tional causes but, nevertheless, were still more likely than 
their peers in the pastoralist region to nominate witchcraft 
as the cause of death, even if this is a result of exposure to
ambient discussion by misinformed farmers who know lit­
tle of cow biology. This, however, is not inconsistent with 
the interpretation I have made of the results: Even experi­
enced pastoralists may be swayed by the poorly informed 
chatter of many neighboring farmers, because diagnosing 
the cause of an animal death is difficult and so social learn­
ing seems to them a better strategy. As I argued in present­
ing the model, on average across domains in which costs 
of learning are high and accuracy is low, individuals who 
employ more pure social learning will be more successful in 
terms of survival and reproduction. Thus the strategy in this 
case may be an adaptation, even if we are prepared to con­
clude that it leads to sometimes maladaptive consequences. 
As countless biologists have pointed out, success is not nec­
essarily nor even usually the right criterion for judging an 
adaptive strategy.
Is Frequency Dependence Im portant 
in These Dom ains?
Frequency dependence arises when the optimal behavior is 
partly determined by what other individuals are doing. In 
the model I proposed, I assumed payoffs were not frequency 
dependent, and in the analyses, I assumed the same. If how­
ever the payoffs in domain 3 are positively frequency de­
pendent, such that individuals are better off believing and 
behaving as the majority, and those in domains 1 and 2 are 
not, then this might explain why I found that farmers in 
the majority pastoralist region thought as pastoralists and 
pastoralists in the majority farmer region thought like farm­
ers. This explanation does not require any social learning at 
all, merely the individual recognition that payoffs are fre­
quency dependent.
In many domains, frequency dependence is very im­
portant (Gil-White 2001; McElreath et al. 2003). When 
many solutions exist to problems in communication, orga­
nization, and coordination, behaving as others do is likely 
to be a good strategy. However, it is difficult to imagine how 
payoffs in supernatural explanations of this kind can be 
frequency dependent, in this sense. However, some anthro­
pologists (Fessler and Haley 2003) think that perhaps most 
domains of culture are moralized, and that individuals with 
minority beliefs are punished. If this is the case in this do­
main, then individuals may adopt majority beliefs because 
doing so helps them avoid punishment, as punishment cre­
ates a kind of frequency dependence. This kind of expla­
nation does not say that individuals necessarily only hold 
these beliefs publicly. If punishment of minority individuals 
is common enough, then people may have a general ten­
dency to believe as the majority, without even consciously 
considering the possibility of punishment. It is difficult to 
rule out a hypotheses such as this without additional data.
Are Ind iv iduals Im ita ting  Ind iv iduals like  
Themselves?
The results in the first two domains raise the question of 
whether social learning is in fact a strong force explaining
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the maintenance of cultural variation here as well. If in­
dividuals who become farmers then preferentially imitate 
farmers, they can come to resemble other farmers even if 
they make no evaluations of the costs and benefits of be­
havior. Albert Bandura (1977) and other social psychologists 
have noted that individuals tend to imitate models similar 
to themselves, providing the psychological reality needed 
for this explanation. It is difficult to exclude this idea with 
the available data. It raises the additional question, how­
ever, of why this economy-oriented imitation is important 
in the first two domains but not the third. Perhaps in the 
first two domains it is easy enough to understand that oth­
ers with the same economic system experience the same 
problems, yet it is still difficult to individually acquire the 
best behavior.
CONCLUSION
This article illustrates the possibility of investigating the 
maintenance of behavioral variation in a natural popula­
tion. I used a model of the evolution of social learning to 
explore the design properties of human social learning, gen­
erating predictions about the kinds of problems for which 
social learning is more likely to be used and subsequently 
affect patterns of variation as individuals and their ideas 
move between regions. Measuring attitudes for several do­
mains that vary with ecology and economy, I have tried to 
estimate the influence of specific individual circumstances, 
manifested in household economies, and ambient culture, 
manifested in community residence. I found that the results 
are consistent with the predictions of the model.
One way to view this study is that it gives comfort to 
all sides of debates about the maintenance of cultural vari­
ation. The model and my interpretation of the field data 
suggest that both those who feel that behavioral variation 
is a reflection of local adaptation via individual (including 
prepared) learning and those who feel that cultural dynam­
ics themselves generate variation are right, depending upon 
the nature of the task or problem to be solved. It is impor­
tant to note however that the distinction is not between 
adaptive and nonadaptive features of behavioral variation. 
Domains in which social learning is dominant can still pro­
duce adaptive variation, as the model illustrates. Yet the 
development (microevolution) of cultural differences and 
the patterning of cultural variation will be different when 
different mechanisms are at work. Some theories like what 
I have presented in this article are needed to organize our 
understanding of when people employ different strategies 
for acquiring their beliefs and behaviors, and any theory of 
this kind will have similarly powerful implications.
These results are important for understanding how dif­
ferences in human behavior form and persist. The theory 
provides intuitions about the roles of the costs and accura­
cies of learning in any given task or problem in determining 
which learning strategies we might expect individuals to 
employ. Knowledge of the strategies individuals are likely 
to employ then allows prediction of the more long-term
patterns of cultural diversity, including which changes in 
the physical and social environments are likely to enhance 
or erode variation. In order to explain why cultures some­
times remain distinct and why they sometimes do not, we 
need some theory explaining how individuals acquire their 
behavior and beliefs. The strategy I have employed here is 
to build a model of how people mix individual and social 
learning. Both forms of learning can lead to the mainte­
nance or erosion of group differences, depending on the 
context. For example, in domains in which costs are low, 
and, therefore, individual learning is powerful, the model 
predicts that groups living in different ecologies might re­
main distinct regardless of the flow of persons between the 
groups. In a uniform ecology, however, a domain in which 
costs are high and social learning is important might main­
tain group differences despite the absence of any meaning­
ful ecological variation. Also, as societies change, the quali­
ties of information available sometimes change, and this al­
ters the accuracy of individual learning. Thus as patterns of 
social interaction and technology change, learning strate­
gies may change as well, leading to different patterns of 
behavioral variation and rates of behavior evolution.
These kinds of predictions are a beginning, but obvi­
ously many elaborations are needed to deal with additional 
complexities of human behavioral variation. How impor­
tant is imitation of parents, peers, or other individuals? 
Some think that vertical transmission is especially impor­
tant to human social transmission (Hewlett and Cavalli- 
Sforza 1986), but the evidence is weak, and others even ar­
gue that parents are largely unimportant as models (Harris
1998). Conformity (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and 
Boyd 1998) provides another mechanism for maintaining 
group variation. But there is little good evidence about how 
conformist transmission functions. How strong is confor­
mity, and how much mixing is needed to overcome its in­
fluence? It is probably also true that people employ different 
learning strategies at different times in their lives (Henrich 
and Gil-White 2001), and this chronological variation in 
strategy will also have consequences for understanding the 
formation and maintenance of behavior differences. At this 
point, there is far more good theory than good data, but if 
anthropology addresses itself to this body of theory, a great 
deal of progress will be made.
Richard McElreath Department of Anthropology, and 
Graduate Groups in Ecology and Animal Behavior, Univer­
sity of California, Davis, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA, 95616
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APPENDIX
Deriving the op tim al m ix o f ind iv idua l and  social 
learn ing in  a spatia lly  and  tem porally  varying 
environm ent
Assume that individual learners begin by imitating a ran­
dom member of the previous generation (or a parent—since 
recombination between genes and culture can be ignored, it 
makes no difference: Boyd and Richerson 1985). They then 
attempt to improve on previous behavior with individual 
learning. This leads to a payoff to an individual learner in 
generation n and environment i :
Vj,„(T) =  bqi,n--\ +  b( 1 -  <f;,„-i)(l - e ) - c  
= b(l - e (l qi,n-i)) c,
where q^-t is the frequency of behavior practiced in gener­
ation n—1 that is currently optimal. Because an individual 
learner can never do worse by beginning with previous be­
havior, assuming individual learning begins with imitation 
never hurts individual learning as a strategy, even when 
none of the previously practiced behavior is currently op­
timal. When = 0 above, the payoff is just as it would 
be if individual learners never imitated. Thus this model is 
very kind to individual learning.
Individuals may also imitate another member of the 
population, without attempting any individual learning, 
and thereby avoid the costs of trial-and-error. The expected 
payoff to an individual who learns purely socially in gener­
ation n and environment i is:
Vl,„(S) = bql,„-1.
While there is no explicit cost to social learning above, 
c is easily interpreted as the extra cost of individual learning.
Here we will add the additional assumption that the 
kind of behavior viewed as "optimal"—in terms of individ­
ual survival and reproduction—varies from time to time be­
cause of fluctuations within each environment, changing 
each generation with some probability v. When the envi­
ronment changes, the previous state does not predict the 
new state, and since there are a very large number of poten­
tial behaviors, we will assume that nearly all previous be­
havior is rendered nonoptimal. The frequency of behavior 
that was practiced in generation n that is currently optimal 
is defined by the recursion:
qt.n = (1 - V)(l - m}( 1 - ck)(1 - e(l - ,)) +
where a is the proportion of individuals in the population 
who learned socially in the previous generation. If the en­
vironment has not changed and rendered a new behavior 
optimal, social learners acquire optimal behavior propor­
tional to its frequency in the previous generation. When 
the environment changes, however, almost none of the be­
haviors practiced in the previous time period are adaptive,
so the expected frequency of adaptive behavior available to 
imitate is approximately zero. Likewise, a proportion m of 
the population after migration is from other environments 
and are unlikely to carry any optimal behavior.
The goal is to know what mix of social and purely in­
dividual learning is favored by natural selection. Obviously 
individuals are not only social learners or individual learn­
ers, but instead sometimes purely imitate and sometimes 
also learn on their own. I formalize this by letting individu­
als practice any mix of individual and social learning, such 
that they learn individually 1-a of the time and socially 
a of the time. It is reasonable to assume that the dynam­
ics of learning take place on much shorter time scales than 
those of natural selection on genes (Boyd and Richerson 
1996; Rogers 1988). In addition, it is easy to show numer­
ically that qi quickly reaches an equilibrium for any given 
mix of individual and social learning in the population. 
The equilibrium value of qi,qi, occurs where qi.,, = qi,n-i 
and is:
„ „ (1 — a)(l — v)(l — m)(\ — e)
1 — (1 — v)(l — m)(a + (1 — a)e)'
As all environments i are alike in these terms, this equi­
librium is the same in all environments.
The expected payoff to a mutant individual who learns 
socially a’ = a + S of the time, once the frequency of opti­
mal behavior goes to equilibrium for a population of indi­
viduals with proportion of social learning a, is:
t^(a') = (1 — a'){(l — e(l — q))b — c} + a’bq.
The evolutionary stable (CSS) value of a, the only pro­
portion that cannot be invaded by individuals employing 
any other proportion or, is found where
a tV )  = 0
95 ,=o '
Solving the above for a yields the evolutionary stable 
proportion of individual learning, a'*:
1 — e(l — v)(l — m) — (1 — e)(v + (1 — v)m)b/c
(X —  ------------------------------------------------------
(1 — e)(l — m)( 1 — v)
When a* > 1, natural selection favors only individual 
learning. When a* < 0, natural selection favors pure social 
learning, because individual learning is so costly or inac­
curate that one would be better off guessing. When there 
are no individual learners, cultural evolution cannot track 
changes in the environment, and the population in fact 
ends up guessing.
Note that, in this model, temporal variation v is com­
pletely analogous to spatial variation. For this reason, I ig­
nore the effects of v in the main text. There are interest­
ing differences between the two types of variation, however 
(Henrich and Boyd 1998).
